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Managing tsunamis through early warning systems: 
 A multidisciplinary approach 
Abstract 
This study attempts to identify the key factors that will make a tsunami warning 
system most effective, to develop a framework in which results of natural science and 
engineering research can be effectively integrated into coastal natural hazard planning, 
and to develop a numerical example that illustrates how benefit-cost analysis may be 
used to assess early warning systems.  Results of the study suggest that while the science 
of tsunami wave propagation and inundation is relatively advanced, our knowledge on 
the relationships between tsunami generation and undersea earthquakes, volcanic 
eruptions, and landslides remains poor, resulting in significant uncertainties in tsunami 
forecasting.  Probabilities of damaging tsunamis for many coastal regions are still 
unknown, making tsunami risk assessment and management difficult.  Thus it is essential 
to develop new techniques to identify paleo-tsunami events and to compile and develop 
size and frequency information on historical tsunamis for different locations.  An 
effective tsunami early warning system must include not only the ocean technologies for 
accurately detecting an emerging tsunami, but also a civil communication system through 
which the population can be timely warned by the local government and other sources.  
Since minimizing the evacuation time is a key factor to make a warning system effective, 
adequate pre-event education and preparation of the population must be a critical 
component of the system.  Results of a numerical example of the South Pacific region 
suggest that investments in a tsunami warning system in the region may lead to 
significant economic benefits. 
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1. Introduction 
The December 26, 2004 giant earthquake
1
 and tsunami killed over 200,000 people 
and caused billions of dollars of damages in 12 countries around the Indian Ocean (UN 
2007).  Many lives could have been saved had there been an effective tsunami warning 
system in this part of the world.  The tsunami exposed major deficits in developing 
countries’ hazard management and emergency response systems.  Following the 2004 
tsunami, the international ocean science community is accelerating work on 
understanding tsunamis, their geological causes, and their impacts on coastal regions.  
This devastating tsunami has prompted countries around the world to reassess tsunami 
risks to their coastal communities and to develop response strategies for future events. 
Natural hazard mitigation is a complex endeavor that requires direct links 
between natural and social sciences.  For example, an effective early warning system 
must include not only the ocean technologies to accurately detect an emerging tsunami, 
but also a public notification system through which the population can be timely warned 
by the local government and other sources.  Indeed, tsunami readiness involves two key 
components: awareness, which may be improved by educating key decision makers, 
emergency managers, and the public about the nature (physical processes) and threat 
(frequency of occurrence, impact) of a hazard; and mitigation, which may be improved 
through pre-event planning.  In recent years, disaster management has changed from 
viewing a problem in isolation to a policy of sustainable hazard mitigation that views 
hazard mitigation as an integral part of a much larger context.  Communities must take 
                                                 
1
 On December 26, 2004 at 07:58 am (local time) a massive undersea earthquake occurred with an 
epicentre off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia.  The magnitude of the earthquake has been measured as 
between 9.1 and 9.3 on the Richter scale, which is the second largest earthquake ever recorded on a 
seismograph. 
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responsibility for choosing where and how development proceeds through land-use 
planning.  Toward that end, each locality evaluates its environmental resources and 
hazards, chooses future losses that it is willing to bear, and ensures that development and 
other community actions and policies adhere to those goals.  Disaster management and 
planning require a longer-term view that takes into account the overall effect of 
mitigation efforts on this and future generations (Mileti 1999).  An effective early 
warning system must be an integral part of disaster risk reduction strategies in national 
development frameworks and requires cooperation amongst many partners at local, 
regional, national, and international levels (UN ISDR 2006a).  Thus an effective tsunami 
hazard mitigation program involves inter-disciplinary collaboration between natural and 
social sciences and requires ocean researchers to work closely with hazard management 
officers. 
The objectives of this study are to identify the key factors (e.g., science and 
management planning) that will make a tsunami warning system most effective, to 
develop a framework in which results of natural science and engineering research can be 
effectively integrated into coastal natural hazard planning, and to develop a numerical 
example that illustrates how benefit-cost analysis may be used to assess early warning 
systems. The study provides a comprehensive review of literature on tsunami and related 
research.  Section 2 describes a multidisciplinary approach for tsunami research.  
Tsunami warning systems are explained in Section 3.  Social science research and 
management programs for natural hazards are discussed in Section 4.  Section 5 
summarizes issues related to economic analyses of warning systems.  Section 6 presents 
an example of the South Pacific region.  The study is summarized in Section 7.    
  
 5 
2. A multidisciplinary approach 
Tsunamis are gravity waves that propagate near the ocean surface (Ward 2001).  
The entire process of a damaging tsunami may be divided into five major components: 
generation, propagation, inundation, damage, and recovery (Figure1).  The first three 
components, describing how waves are generated, travel across the ocean, and come 
ashore, are the focus of geosciences research.  The last two components, the impacts of 
tsunami on society and how coastal communities recover from damage and destruction, 
are the focus of social science research. 
2.1. Tsunami generation 
Ranging from the most to least frequent, there are four causes of tsunamis: 
undersea earthquake, submarine landslide, volcanic explosion, and bolide impact
2
 (Okal 
2006).  Only a small proportion of strong earthquakes produce detectable tsunamis.  
Damaging tsunamis occur even less frequently.  During the 20
th
 century, damaging 
tsunamis occurred at a frequency of 5-21 times per decade worldwide (Figure 2, NOAA 
2005).  Because they are very rare for a specific place, location-specific probability 
distributions for these events are not known for many coastal regions of the world. 
2.2. Propagation 
Tsunamis are gravity waves and they are distinct from common sea waves in their 
mode of generation and in their characteristic period, wavelength, and velocity (Ward 
2001).  Tsunamis are much slower (e.g., 220 m/s) than seismic waves (e.g., 3 to 10 km/s) 
(Okal 2006).  For the purpose of developing warning systems, tsunami travel time maps 
for the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans have been prepared (Nirupama et al. 2006; 
                                                 
2
 For an analysis of impact-generated tsunamis see Chesley and Ward (2006). 
  
 6 
Bhaskaran et al. 2005; NGDC 2007).  These are charts showing tsunami travel times 
from a starting point (epicenter) to various locations around the rim of the ocean. 
2.3. Inundation 
Wave run-up is a complex process (Chesley and Ward 2006).  The height and 
destructive forces on landing of a given offshore wave may vary significantly for 
different landfall locations, depending on the physical and geological features of the 
surrounding coastline.  Because of its complexity, how tsunamis propagate and interact 
with shores is typically analyzed using numerical simulations (Okal 2006). 
2.4. Damage 
Tsunami impacts onshore are affected by many factors including topography of 
the coastal area, geologic and ecological conditions (e.g., sand dunes, mangrove forests, 
and coral reefs), and social and economic conditions (e.g., population density).
3
  
Papadopoulos and Imamura (2001) have proposed a new 12-point scale to measure 
tsunami intensity.  The scale is arranged according to a tsunami’s effects on humans, 
vessels, buildings and other objects, and the natural environment.  During the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami, three devastating waves struck the western shore of Aceh within about 30 
minutes.  The tsunami waves ranged from 4 to 39 meters high and destroyed more than 
250 coastal communities (Cluff 2007). 
Research on tsunami damage consists of computer model assessment of simulated 
tsunami events for specific coastal communities (Papathoma and Dominey-Howes 2003) 
and site investigation of past events.  After the 2004 tsunami, damage analyses included 
                                                 
3
 Timing of tsunami occurrence is also an important factor.  When the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami hit Aceh, 
many fishermen were at sea, leaving behind women and children.  It was the height of the tourist season in 
Thailand; Phuket alone had an estimated 35,000 visitors a day (Atwood 2006). 
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both on site engineering damage assessment of houses, roads and bridges, industrial 
facilities, and electric power network (Cluff 2007) and large-scale damage analysis (e.g., 
mapping percentage of buildings collapsed) using remote sensing techniques (Berke 
2006).  Using the 12-point scale, Narayan et al. (2006) developed tsunami intensity 
mapping and identified damage patterns along the coast of Tamilnadu (India).  Results of 
these analyses provide vital inputs to the development of tsunami evacuation maps 
(Oregon Emergency Management 2007) and to the improvement of coastal disaster 
management planning. 
2.5. Recovery 
For a given level of damage severity, the recovery process is influenced by 
emergency response and the pace of reconstruction; both are critical to reducing human 
suffering and diseases.  Emergency response involves not only the supply of food, 
medicine, and shelter, but also prevention of disease following the emergency by 
improving health and sanitation conditions (WHO 2005).  Both response and rebuilding 
typically require external assistance; this is especially true for developing countries. 
Since tsunamis are much slower than seismic waves, it should be possible to 
provide warning based on interpretation of seismic waves, at least in the case of a far 
field tsunami that is created by an earthquake at great distance.  However, a number of 
factors make the development of an effective warning system a very challenging task.  It 
is difficult to measure the true size and seismic energy of very large earthquakes.  
Uncertainties remain as to factors that contribute to the generation of tsunamis.  In the 
near field, there is little to essentially no time to issue warnings.  As noted above, 
research on tsunami events must progress based on extremely small samples (Okal 2006).  
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Since 1948, 75% of all warnings issued have preceded non-destructive tsunamis.  The 
cost of an over-predicted alarm can be substantial.  For example, the evacuation of 
Honolulu in 1986 costed $40 million (NOAA 2004). 
Since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, various efforts have been made to upgrade 
and expand the world’s tsunami warning systems.  Although the improved warning 
technologies (e.g., better spatial distributions of DART (Deep-ocean Assessment and 
Reporting of Tsunami) buoys and coastal tide gauges and better seismological and 
tsunami modeling capabilities) can address issues like over-predicted alarms, the 
implementation of effective warning procedures transcends the physical sciences (Okal 
2006).  As we will discuss next, to improve the effectiveness of warning systems, 
researchers and hazard management agencies must work together through a 
multidisciplinary approach integrating geosciences, engineering, social sciences, and 
emergency response and management. 
3. Tsunami warning system 
The physical science part of a typical tsunami warning system has four 
components: a seismographic network, a buoy (e.g., DART) and tide gauge network, 
computer modeling and analysis, and a warning center.
4
 
3.1. Instruments 
The seismic stations are installed across the globe.  DART-like buoys are 
deployed in the deep oceans offshore, while tide gauges are located along coastal lines.  
Since only a small proportion of strong earthquakes produce a damaging tsunami, a 
                                                 
4
 Okal (1994) presented an excellent introduction to the physical science part of a tsunami warning system, 
its theoretical background, and key components (e.g., earthquake, wave analysis, and seismic moment). 
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warning system based solely on seismic data is prone to producing false alarms.  To 
reduce false alarm, DART and GLOSS (Global Sea Level Observing System) 
instruments are used to verify if a tsunami has indeed been triggered.  The DART system 
uses buoys and sensors stationed far out to sea.  A typical DART buoy system works as 
follows: (1) a recorder on seabed measures water pressure periodically (e.g., every 15 
minutes) while an unusual signal could trigger more frequent reading (e.g., every 15 
seconds); (2) a buoy measures sea surface conditions and sends this information, plus 
data from the seabed, to a satellite; and (3) the satellite relays the data to ground stations.  
GLOSS consists of tide gauges installed along the coasts of the world’s oceans.  After the 
2004 tsunami, there was a major upgrade of sea level observing stations along the coast 
of Indian Ocean (BBC 2005) as well as installation of new DART buoys in the Pacific, 
Atlantic, and Caribbean regions. The GITEWS (German-Indonesian Tsunami Early 
Warning System) project has led to the developments of a new set of hardware (e.g., GPS 
buoy) and software for Indonesia (Rudloff et al. 2009). 
3.2. System integration 
All the above hardware and software need to be integrated into an efficient 
system.  In 1987 the TREMORS (Tsunami Risk Evaluation through seismic Moment Of 
a Real-time System) was installed in the French Polynesia.  This is an automated system 
that detects distant earthquakes, locates them, computes their seismic moment, and issues 
a seismic warning (Reymond et al. 1996).  The TREMORS method relies on a magnitude 
scale (Mm), using mantle Rayleigh waves, that is directly related to seismic moment 
(M0) and improved detection algorithms (Okal and Talandier 1989).  The system has 
been deployed in Hawaii, Indonesia, Chile, Portugal, and other places.  A TREMORS 
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station at an epicentral distance of 15° (1,667 km) can issue a useful warning 10 minutes 
before the tsunami reaches a shore located 400 km from the event.  In this example, the 
required time for TREMORS algorithm response (about 20 minutes) is shorter than the 
time of a tsunami to travel from the earthquake epicenter to the concerned coastal 
location (about 30 minutes for a tsunami traveling at 220 m/s), thus making a warning 
possible.  The 2004 tsunami hit Thailand approximately 2 hours after the earthquake.  
Had a TREMORS station been in place in the region, it could have provided a warning 
significantly ahead of the tsunami and saved lives (Okal 2006).  Started in 2005, the 
GITEWS project was designed to set up a tsunami warning system optimal for the 
Indonesian coast.  The project has developed new technologies and scientific concepts, 
including the integration of near real-time GPS deformation monitoring as well as new 
modeling techniques and decision supporting procedures. The resulting system has 
reduced early-warning times down to 5–10 minutes (Rudloff et al. 2009) 
3.3. Warning center operation 
Even the world’s most advanced tsunami warning system still requires human 
inputs.  At the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) located at Ewa Beach in 
Hawaii, two scientists are on call 24 hours a day and 7 days a week (NOAA National 
Weather Service 2008a).  They live on the site and can report in 2 minutes.  The Center 
monitors about 120 seismic stations around the Pacific Basin (PBS 2005) and 60 
Marigraph stations (tide gauges).  The automated system at the Center can detect an 
earthquake in 3 minutes and locate it in 4 minutes.  It takes a few minutes for the 
scientists to quantify the earthquake and to make a preliminary assessment of its tsunami 
risk based on combined factors of the estimated earthquake size, pre-computed tsunami 
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models, and historical record of tsunamis (if any) for historical earthquakes occurring in 
the same region.  After an initial assessment is made, however, it takes significantly 
longer for scientists to use the DART buoy and tide gauge observations to verify if a 
tsunami has indeed occurred.  The required time for the confirmation is controlled by the 
time for the tsunami wave to reach the closest DART buoys and/or tide gauges.  Based on 
the decisions of the scientists, the Center issues warnings to Pacific-rim countries.  In 
practice, the Center routinely issues an initial assessment of tsunami potential shortly 
after a significant earthquake, which is followed by updated information when more 
accurate tsunami and earthquake information becomes available.  Such later tsunami 
updates could contain information on cancellation of an earlier warning. 
The warning messages from the Center are disseminated to a list of designated 
federal, state, and local emergency management agencies and personnel, international 
partners, as well as other prescribed users.  Depending on the severity of the tsunami 
warning, local authorities may decide to further disseminate the warning by patrol cars, 
sirens, and paging and order an evacuation.  It has been estimated by the Honolulu Police 
Department that the evacuation of Waikiki before a tsunami would require 2.5 hours 
(Okal 2006).  The US West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WC/ATWC) 
located in Palmer, Alaska uses similar strategy in issuing tsunami warning (NOAA 
National Weather Service 2008b).  Currently the WC/ATWC is responsible for issuing 
tsunami warning and information to the the US coastal states except Hawaii, Canadian 
coastal regions, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, while the PTWC is responsible for 
warning the state of Hawaii and international partners (NOAA National Weather Service 
2008a, 2008b). 
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3.4. The time dimension 
For an effective tsunami warning system, time is of the essence.  Braddock (2003) 
specifies the time constraint for the system as: 
4321 TTTT   (1) 
where T1 is detection time, T2 is assessment time, T3 is evacuation time, and T4 is tsunami 
travel time (Figure 3).  Since T4 is exogenous, to make the warning system effective the 
time needed for warning and evacuation (T1 + T2 + T3) should be minimized, i.e., it is 
essential to 

min(T1T2 T3 ). (2) 
Detection time (T1) can be shortened by optimizing locations of seismic stations, 
DART buoys and tide gauges,
5
 by implementing global real-time data telemetry for the 
monitoring system (Holgate et al. 2007), and by improving data processing and model 
algorithms.  To shorten assessment time (T2) requires improvements in our ability to 
measure the true size and seismic energy of very large earthquakes, to understand factors 
contributing to tsunami generation, and to make warning decision using only small 
historical data samples.  Unlike T1 and T2, the evacuation time (T3) of a community is 
affected by its emergency planning, education, communication network, and other socio-
economic, environmental, and circumstantial factors such as the time of the day when a 
tsunami occurs and whether it is a tourist season, etc.  In many cases, significant potential 
exists to reduce T3.  According to the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(ISDR 2006b), among both developed and developing nations, the weakest elements are 
                                                 
5
 Spatial design of a tsunami warning system has been modeled by Braddock (2003).  The model takes 
financial budget, locations of tsunami generation points, and locations of population centers as inputs, and 
calculates the number and locations of buoys so that the “total warning potential” (i.e., fraction of 
population can be saved by a warning) is maximized. 
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warning dissemination and preparedness to act.  Warning may fail to reach those who 
must take action, and may not be adequately understood or address the concerns of the 
local authority and population. 
To be effective, early warning systems must be people-centered and must 
integrate four elements: (1) knowledge of the risks faced, (2) technical monitoring and 
warning service, (3) dissemination of meaningful warnings to those at risk, and (4) public 
actions responding to the warnings, which can be improved by pre-event awareness and 
preparedness to act.  Failure in any one of these elements can mean failure of the whole 
early warning system (ISDR 2006b). 
3.5. The near field 
If the distance between the earthquake epicenter and the shore is less than 400 
km, it takes less than about 30 minutes for a tsunami to reach the shore.  The 2004 
tsunami hit Aceh within 15 minutes.  In these cases of near field tsunamis, there is little 
lead time for tsunami warning.  Coastal communities have to rely on self-evacuation 
triggered by evidence of tsunami danger, such as direct sensing of the earthquake by the 
population and anomalous behavior (retreat) of the sea.
6
  Self-evacuation requires an 
educated population.  Nevertheless, warnings may still be useful in the near field to 
trigger automated responses (e.g., head to high ground immediately, shut off gas lines, 
stop trains, close sluices, etc.), so that damages may be minimized (Okal 2006). 
4. Social science research 
                                                 
6
 There was a considerable recession of tsunami waters at Kata Noi Beach, Phuket, Thailand, before the 
third, and strongest, tsunami wave on December 26, 2004 (Atwood 2006). 
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It has been widely recognized that natural disasters are the joint product of natural 
and human activities (Russell 1970; Zeckhauser 1996; NRC 2006).  The expected 
damage of tsunamis (D) can be expressed as 

D  E[L(N ,H ,S)] (3) 
where N is a stochastic variable capturing natural events (e.g., frequency and magnitude 
of tsunamis), H denotes the human action, S represents the socio-economic conditions of 
a community, L is the loss function, and E is the expectations operator. 
For a tsunami of certain magnitude, the level of damage is significantly affected 
by the cumulative actions that coastal communities take prior to the event.  These actions 
include where and how to build houses, what industries to develop, investment in natural 
hazard mitigation, and protections of the coastal ecosystems.  The actions are results of 
economic development decisions that are driven by socio-economic characteristics of the 
community (Figure 4). 
While geoscience research improves our understanding of N, the focus of social 
science research is on H and S.  Specifically, social science research involves 
characterization of coastal communities and identification of policy instruments (e.g., 
land use planning) that can alter human actions in these communities so that future 
damage can be minimized. 
4.1. Characterization of coastal communities 
Disasters manifest pre-existing conditions within the social, economic, physical, 
and environmental fabrics of a society (Villagrán de León 2006).  Thus, community 
studies are important in tsunami management.  In summarizing lessons from Thailand 
and Indonesia in the 2004 tsunami, Atwood (2006) suggests that disasters lead to an 
  
 15 
exaggeration of previous inequities, enhancing the vulnerability of the most vulnerable.  
At the onset of a disaster, most families are equally needy, but not all are equally 
vulnerable.  In planning a medium and long-term response it is important to identify 
those who are most vulnerable.  Baseline data are also crucial for immediate assessment 
and response planning after a disaster event.
7
 
Community study often starts with collection of baseline data on physical and 
demographic conditions (e.g., population density and infrastructure), socio-economic 
conditions (e.g., level of economic development and community participation), and 
environmental conditions (e.g., forest area and over-used area).  In-depth analysis of a 
community involves the development of a community profile depicting formal and 
informal organizations, networking among members of the community, and links to 
external organizations.  The analysis develops an assessment of social capital and 
organizational capability in the community (Berke 2006).  Social capital in a community 
is a measure of civic engagement (e.g., volunteer activity), social networks, trust (in other 
residents and internal and external organizations), and organization capability for 
collective action in the community (NRC 2006). 
Individual characteristics of a community (e.g., population and social network) 
can be quantified using indexes; and these indexes can be combined in a variety of ways 
into one or more aggregate indexes (e.g., social capital index) by assigning weights to 
each individual index and then summing across weighted index values.  These indexes 
                                                 
7
 After the 2004 tsunami, it was difficult to assess early needs in Aceh, as demographic and infrastructure 
data were not available.  As a result, supplies were either over- or under-estimated, location of populations 
was difficult to identify, and percentage affected was impossible to estimate as the denominator was not 
known (Atwood 2006). 
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are used for assessing relative risks and vulnerabilities to different stresses (Yohe and Tol 
2002; Berke 2006).  
4.2. Vulnerability assessment 
In studies of natural disasters, the effects of human action and socio-economic 
conditions (H and S) on losses are typically analyzed through vulnerability assessment. 
According to Adger et al. (2005), observed increases in damages associated with weather 
and climate events are caused by changing social vulnerabilities as much as by changing 
physical hazards.  Villagrán de León (2006) provides an excellent review of relevant 
studies.  Vulnerability (V) may be modeled as 
)R,Y,P(gV   (4) 
where P is exposure, Y is susceptibility, and R is resilience.  Exposure is related to the 
location of the community with respect to hazard; susceptibility may reflect deficiencies 
in preparedness; and resilience, also known as coping capacity, describes the abilities to 
cope with and to recover from the hazard stress.  V is positively related to P and Y while 
negatively related to R.  Indexes for variables P, Y, and R are constructed from relevant 
community studies.  The vulnerability indicators are often used in ranking different 
communities for the identification of management priorities (Yohe and Tol 2002; 
Villagrán de León 2006).  Key factors affecting vulnerability are summarized in Table 1.  
Vulnerability needs to be understood in a broad context that includes many social, 
economic, and environmental components at different levels.  Numerous studies have 
dealt with subsets of these components.  For example, the issue of insurance against 
natural disasters has been examined by Kunreuther and Sheaffer (1970) and by Attanasi 
and Karlinger (1979).  Rose (2004) presented an analysis of the definition and 
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measurement of economic resilience to disasters.  The study showed that economic 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling is a useful framework for analyzing the 
behavior of individuals, business, and markets, and could be used to quantify economic 
resilience.  Green (2004) evaluated household vulnerability to flooding using system 
analysis. 
Adger et al. (2005) discussed social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters.  
Resilience is the capacity of linked social-ecological systems to absorb recurrent 
disturbances such as hurricanes or floods so as to retain essential structures, processes, and 
feedback.  Wherever ecosystems have been undermined, the ability to adapt and regenerate 
has been severely eroded.  They suggest that resilient social-ecological systems incorporate 
diverse mechanisms for living with, and learning from, changes and unexpected shocks.  
Disaster management requires multilevel governance systems that can enhance the capacity 
to cope with uncertainty and surprise by mobilizing diverse sources of resilience. 
4.3. Natural disaster management programs 
There have been considerable efforts around the world to improve and expand 
natural disaster warning and management programs.  The UN’s International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction has developed a checklist for developing early warning systems 
(ISDR 2006c) that provides useful guidance for systematic program development.  The 
checklist consists of four key elements: risk knowledge, monitoring and warning service, 
dissemination and communication, and response capability; and a cross-cutting issue: 
effective governance and institutional arrangement (Table 2). 
At the community level, NOAA National Weather Service’s TsunamiReady 
program provides a good example.  The program is designed to reflect two basic 
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concepts: education is the key to increased awareness of the hazard, while pre-event 
planning is the key to effective mitigation.  To be recognized as tsunami ready, a 
community must meet a set of requirements (Table 3).  As of February of 2008, there are 
50 coastal communities in the United States that have been certified as TsunamiReady 
(NOAA National Weather Service 2008c). 
5. Benefit-cost analysis for tsunami warning 
Tsunami warning systems can be very costly.  For example, cost estimates for a 
tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean range from $27 million (Padma 2004) to 
$200 million (Jean 2005; Stone and Kerr 2005), depending on system components and 
technologies (e.g., number of DART buoys and measurement precision).  Because of 
competition for limited financial resources, investments in tsunami warning systems need 
economic justification using benefit-cost analysis. 
A benefit-cost analysis for a warning system is straightforward in concept.  The 
investment (C) is justified if 
C)B(E  . (5) 
where B is the benefit from the system (i.e., live saved and damage avoided).  In practice, 
there are two issues that make the analysis difficult.  First, it is a very complex task to 
quantify benefits to the communities being served (e.g., lives saved and damages avoided 
across different sectors in the economy).  The task becomes even more complex when the 
warning system is evaluated in a multi-hazard framework.
8
 
                                                 
8
 The economies of scale, sustainability and efficiency can be enhanced if natural disaster warning systems 
and operational activities are established and maintained within a multipurpose framework that considers 
all hazards and end user needs.  
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In addition, the probability of tsunami events for a specific location is typically 
unknown.  Societies are not very good at dealing with probabilistic information and 
related issues, particularly when the probability is very small but the damage is 
catastrophic.  Exaggeration of risks of tsunamis can lead to over investment in warning 
systems (Figure 5).  Thus information on the probability of disaster events is important 
for formulating social policies and management decisions (Kunreuther 2006). 
5.1. Economic studies of natural hazards 
The economics of tsunami warning systems is a new research topic.  Both 
analytical and empirical studies on the subject are extremely limited in scope and 
number.  The studies of a related natural hazard, earthquakes, provide useful analytical 
approaches and modeling techniques. 
Liu and Hsieh (1981) developed an integrated model for earthquake risk and 
damage assessment.  The model consists of three sub-models: physical damage functions, 
economic damage functions, and institutional aspects related to risk mitigation policies 
and community preparedness.  For a given earthquake risk of a certain magnitude at a 
specific location, the expected damage is a function of population density, housing and 
other economic characteristics, mitigation policies, and time of the event (night vs. day).  
The economic damage is the sum of costs associated with human deaths and injuries, 
housing structural damages, and other economic losses.  Ellson et al. (1984) constructed a 
regional econometric model to assess the potential economic effects of earthquakes and 
earthquake predictions in Charleston, South Carolina.  In the model, the economic 
damages resulting from an earthquake are estimated in four categories: death, housing 
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destruction, capital losses (e.g., factories, equipment, and inventories), and disruption in 
transportation flows. 
Schulze et al. (1990) investigated the economic feasibility of earthquake 
prediction as a function of program performance for the San Andreas Fault region (Los 
Angeles area).  Following Sieh (1978), they modeled earthquake risk over time using a 
Weibull distribution (often used to describe mechanical or structural failures from strain 
and wearing out).  Their model explicitly considers successful vs. false predictions, and 
the cost of false alarms is treated as part of the total of cost of the prediction program.  In 
addition, the model captures the effects of future population growth.  Based on the 
increasing probability of a major earthquake in the region, the study concludes that the 
expected benefits of a prediction program may well exceed the expected costs. 
The Multihazard Mitigation Council (2005) developed a systematic assessment of 
future savings from mitigation activities in the United States.  They show that natural 
hazard mitigation activities funded by the FEMA between 1993 and 2003 were cost 
effective and reduced future losses from earthquake, wind, and flood events.  The benefit 
to cost ratio was 4:1 (i.e., a dollar spent on mitigation saved society 4 dollars). 
5.2. Public risk perception 
Understanding public risk perception toward low probability but high loss events 
is important for the evaluation and improvement of tsunami warning programs.  Again, 
the studies of earthquake and other natural disasters are relevant. 
Using property value data from Los Angeles County and the San Francisco Bay 
Area counties, Brookshire et al. (1985) showed that individuals paid less for houses 
located in relatively hazardous areas, ceteris paribus.  The result suggests that the 
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expected utility hypothesis (widely used in economic decision making models) is a 
reasonable description of behavior for consumers who face a low-probability, high-loss 
natural hazard event, given that they have adequate information. 
Bernknopf et al. (1990) examined the effect of earthquake and volcano hazard 
notices on investment and recreation activities of the Mammoth Lakes, California area.  
The study found that the hazard notices did not affect recreation visitation, although 
investment was affected.  Beron et al. (1997) analyzed residential housing sales data from 
the San Francisco Bay area together with geologic variables to estimate the hedonic price 
of earthquake risk before and after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.  Their results 
suggested that consumers initially overestimated the earthquake hazard. 
According to Kunreuther (2006), extensive evidence indicates that residents in 
hazard-prone areas do not undertake loss prevention measures voluntarily.  Individuals 
underestimate the likelihood of a future disaster, often believing that it will not happen to 
them.
9
  Individuals are often myopic and hence only take into account the potential 
benefits from risk reduction investments over the next year or two.  To reduce long-term 
future losses from natural disasters thus often requires partnerships between the private 
and public sectors, for example through well-enforced building codes and land-use 
regulations coupled with insurance protection.  Economic incentives that make these 
actions financially palatable to property owners need to be provided in the form of long-
term mitigation loans and subsidies to low-income residents of high-hazard areas. 
5.3. Optimal level of investment 
                                                 
9
 Rich context information must be available for people to be able to judge differences between low 
probabilities.  One needs to present comparison scenarios that are located on the probability scale to evoke 
people’s own feelings of risk (Kunreuther et al. 2001). 
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As discussed in Russell (1970), the benefits and costs vary as the level of 
protection against natural hazards is changed.  In the case of tsunami hazard the level of 
protection may be described by the accuracy of a tsunami warning system that depends 
on, among other things, the density of monitoring stations along the coast.  In general, we 
expect that the benefits of a very basic version of the tsunami warning system may be 
moderate but may grow rapidly as the number of coastal monitoring stations increases.  
At some point, the benefit of adding more monitoring stations may diminish or even 
approach zero.  Meanwhile, the costs of investments in the warning system are expected 
to increase as more stations are established.  The decision is to minimize the expected 
social costs (SC) of future tsunami events by choosing the level of protection (): 
))([  (SC)min 

 CDEE  (6) 
where D represents the total damages resulting from tsunami occurrences, and C 
represents investment in the monitoring system, including capital and labor costs.  The 
choice variable () represents the “accuracy” of a monitoring system.  Over the relevant 
range, more accurate monitoring will increase C.  On the benefit side, the effect of an 
increase in  is captured by the reduction in damage D.  The optimal level of investment 
in a warning system is that which minimizes the sum of C and D (Figure 6). 
6. Tsunami warning in the South Pacific region: A numerical illustration of benefit-
cost analysis  
To illustrate the very basic components of a benefit-cost analysis of a tsunami 
warning system in a specific region, we use the South Pacific and the DART buoy system 
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as an example.
10
  Managing natural disasters is an important issue in the region due to its 
unique characteristics.  Islands in the South Pacific are environmentally and economically 
vulnerable due to their small territorial sizes, geographically remote locations, proximity 
to active zones of large earthquakes and volcanic chains, and relatively weak economies 
(Shea 2003; Briguglio 2006; UNICEF 2006).  Pacific Islands are among the most-hazard 
prone areas in the world (Haque 2003). 
We start with the cost side.  As noted in Section 3, the physical science part of a 
tsunami warning system consists of a seismographic network, a tide gauge and DART 
buoy network, computer modeling and analysis, and a warning center.  In most cases, the 
tsunami warning system can utilize the existing seismic network and natural hazard 
management infrastructure in the region, although they may need upgrading.  Most 
investments are for the installation of a network of tide gauges and DART buoys and 
related communication links.  Reported unit cost estimates for DART buoys and sea-level 
tide gauges are summarized in Table 4. 
Because a warning system is typically composed of multiple offshore DART 
buoys and a larger number of tide gauges along the coast, system-wide cost estimates 
vary according to the buoy-tide gauge combination and technical complexity (Padma 
2004; Stone and Kerr 2005).  A cash-flow analysis is shown in Table 5.  It is assumed, 
based on cost estimates in Table 4, that the low- and high-end costs for installation are 
$0.29 and $0.31 million per DART unit, respectively, while the annual costs for 
operation and maintenance are $50,000 and $125,000 per DART unit, respectively.  For a 
designed life of 15 years and an annual discount rate of 7%, the total cost in present value 
                                                 
10
 It should be stressed that the example presented here does not constitute a detailed case study for a 
specific investment project evaluation, which is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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terms is between $0.75 and $1.45 million per DART unit.  In terms of annuity, the low- 
and high-end estimates are $81,840 and $159,036 per DART unit, respectively.  The 
warning system in the South Pacific may include from 3 to 5 DART units.  Thus, for a 
basic system with 3 DART units, the low-end cost is $245,521/year.  For a more 
complete system with 5 units, the high-end cost is $795,182/year. 
We now look at the benefit side.  Basic economic and population data for 
countries and territories in the South Pacific region are shown in Table 6.  Note that the 
GDP data are not always consistent as some are in nominal (exchange rate-based) and 
others in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) dollars.  The total annual economic output in the 
region is close to $20 billion, of which $10 billion are from independent countries while 
the rest from the territories of other countries.  There are over 8 million people living in 
the region. 
Benefits associated with tsunami warning depend on many factors as discussed in 
the previous sections.  Essentially, the benefits (damages avoided) may be estimated as 
the difference between tsunami damages associated with two different scenarios: without 
and with a warning system as described above: 
wo DDB   (7) 
Damages with effective warning (Dw) are lower than those without warning (Do), 
as many lives (productive forces in the economies) will be saved and the damages to 
infrastructure minimized through evacuations and activations of preventative systems 
(e.g., shutting down power lines, etc.). 
Accurate benefit estimation requires multidisciplinary efforts and considerable 
data collection and model simulations, which is beyond the scope of the study.  Here, we 
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illustrate the concept in Table 7.  Analyses of the damages associated with the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami suggest that island nations, due to their small geographical size 
and economic structure, suffered the highest losses in terms of percentage of their GDP 
(ADB 2005).  For example, losses in Maldives and Sri Lanka represented 45% and 7% of 
their GDP, respectively (RMS 2006; Athukorala and Resosudarmo 2005).  Although the 
$4.5 billion losses in Aceh accounted for the entire GDP in the region, it represented only 
2.3% of the total GDP of Indonesia (Athukorala and Resosudarmo 2005).  Assuming, in 
our example, that the damages avoided are 45% of the regional economic output, and the 
probability of a damaging tsunami is 1/100 (once every 100 years
11
), the expected 
benefits are $90 million per year for the entire region and $45 million per year for the 
independent countries.  If the damages avoided are reduced to 7% of the economic output 
and the event occurs once every 500 years
12
 (0.002), the annual benefits estimates are 
reduced to $2.8 and $1.4 million, respectively. 
Combining the annual cost estimates (Table 5) with the above benefit estimates 
(Table 7), we can calculate the benefit-cost ratios.  Note that the column showing low 
benefit-cost ratio in Table 7 is associated with higher-end cost estimates in Table 5.  The 
results suggest that in most cases, the installation of a regionally operated tsunami 
warning system in the South Pacific is economically justified, because the benefits are 
significantly greater than the costs.  The warning system would not be justified only for a 
scenario assuming the event probability is extremely low (0.001 or once every 1,000 
years), the damages avoided are small (1% of GDP), the high-end system cost estimates 
are applicable, and the independent countries finance the warning system alone (as 
                                                 
11
 For tsunami statistics in the Pacific region, see NOAA (2005).  
12
 For a discussion of global tsunami hazard and event probability, see RMS (2006). 
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warnings to the territories may be provided by relevant home countries).  Closer 
international collaborations in tsunami management efforts between the independent 
countries and the territories of other countries could further cut down the costs and make 
a tsunami warning system even more justified economically for the South Pacific region. 
7. Summary 
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was the first natural disaster in recent memory 
that affected many countries simultaneously, making it a truly international catastrophe.  
Because of its sheer scale of impact, this disaster broke new ground in many aspects of 
natural hazard management and response.  How coastal communities manage risks 
associated with major tsunamis is an issue of global importance.  
Damages from natural disasters are jointly determined by nature and humans.  
Disaster management has evolved from dealing with an event in isolation to adopting a 
policy of sustainable hazard mitigation, where hazard mitigation is viewed as an integral 
part of the much larger context of environmental sustainability (Mileti 1999). 
Natural hazard mitigation is a complex endeavor that requires the integration of 
natural and social sciences (i.e., a multidisciplinary approach).  A recent NRC report 
(2006) called for integration of five core topics of hazards and disaster research: hazard 
vulnerability, hazard mitigation, emergency response, disaster recovery, and disaster 
preparedness.  The integrated framework requires an increase in collaborative work by 
social scientists with natural scientists and engineers. 
The science of tsunami wave propagation and inundation is relatively advanced.  
However, our knowledge on the relationship between tsunami generation and undersea 
earthquakes, volcanism, and landslides remains poor.  Probabilities of damaging tsunamis 
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for many parts of the world are usually unknown.  Thus it is essential to develop new 
techniques to identify paleo-tsunami events and to compile and develop size and 
frequency information on historical tsunamis for different locations.  The information is 
critical for management decision making. 
An effective tsunami warning system must include not only the ocean 
technologies for accurately detecting an emerging tsunami, but also a civil 
communication system through which the local government can effectively and timely 
warn the population.  In fact, the evacuation time (how quickly a community can 
evacuate) is a key factor to make a warning system effective.  Thus it is essential to invest 
in disaster education and training.  Investments leading to an increase in social capital 
will enable communities to cope with disasters of all kinds. 
The results of a numerical example of benefit-cost analysis for the South Pacific 
region suggest that investments in a tsunami warning system in the region may lead to 
significant economic benefits.  Economic justification of a warning system is influenced 
by the expected benefit (damage avoided), event probability, and costs of the system.  
The example also highlights the fact that tsunamis affect many different countries 
throughout a large region.  Thus, tsunami research and management require a coherent 
effort at the global and regional levels and broad participations from both government 
and private sectors. 
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Table 1. Factors Affecting Vulnerability 
 
Factors Increasing Vulnerability Factors Reducing Vulnerability 
 
 Increasing population 
 Marginality and poverty 
 Lack of access to credit and 
insurance 
 Unplanned land use 
 Certain habits and traditions 
 Unemployment and illiteracy 
 City expansion and unplanned 
growth 
 Lack of building codes or their 
enforcement 
 Ecosystem degradation  
 Improvements in social capital 
 More equal distribution of political 
and economic resources 
 Training and education 
 Land-use planning 
 Enforcement of building codes 
 Diversification of economies 
 Provide more opportunities, 
resources, and power to women and 
disadvantaged groups. 
 Ecosystem protection  
 
 
 
Source: Villagrán de León (2006) with minor modification. 
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Table 2. Developing Early Warning Systems: A Checklist 
 
Risk knowledge 
1. Organizational arrangements established 
2. Natural hazards identified 
3. Community vulnerability analyzed 
4. Risk assessed 
5. Information stored and accessible 
 
Monitoring and warning service 
1. Institutional mechanisms established 
2. Monitoring systems developed 
3. Forecasting and warning systems established 
 
Dissemination and communication 
1. Organizational and decision-making processes institutionalized 
2. Effective communication systems and equipment installed 
3. Warning messages recognized and understood 
 
Response capability 
1. Warning respected 
2. Disaster preparedness and response plans established 
3. Community response capability assessed and strengthened 
4. Public awareness and education enhanced 
 
Governance and institutional arrangements 
1. Early warning secured as a long term national and local priority 
2. Legal and policy frameworks to support early warning established 
3. Institutional capacities assessed and enhanced 
4. Financial resources secured. 
 
 
Source: ISDR (2006c).  
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Table 3. NOAA National Weather Service (NWS) TsunamiReady Program Requirements 
 
Communications & Coordination 
       24 hour Warning Point (WP) 
       Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
 
NWS Warning Reception 
       Multiple ways for EOC/WP to receive NWS tsunami messages
*
 
 
Hydrometeorological Monitoring 
       Multiple systems to monitor hydrometeoroligical data
*
  
 
Warning Dissemination 
       Multiple ways for EOC/WP to disseminate warnings to public
*
 
       NOAA Weather Radio tone-alert receivers in public facilities 
       Communication network ensuring information flow between communities 
 
Community Preparedness 
       Annual tsunami/weather safety programs
*
 
       Tsunami shelter/area in safe zone 
       Evacuation areas 
       Evacuation routes and evacuation route signs 
       Written, locality specific, tsunami hazard response material to public 
       Tsunami hazard curriculum in schools 
       Practice evacuations 
 
Administration 
       Formal tsunami hazard operations plan 
       Yearly meeting by emergency manager with NWS 
 
Note: 
*
 Number grows with population in the community. 
Source: NOAA Weather Service (2005). 
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Table 4. Unit Costs of Warning System Components 
 
Components Unit Cost 
DART buoy installation $/unit 250,000 
DART buoy maintenance $/unit/year 50,000-125,000 
Sea-level gauge $/unit 5,000 
Communication link $/unit 20,000-40,000 
   
Sources: Bernard et al. (2001), Heiprin (2005) and Symonds (2005).
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Table 5. Cash-Flow Analysis of Annual System Costs of a Warning System 
  
Year Annual Cost ($) Present Value
*
 ($) 
 Low High Low High 
Installation/DART unit
**
 
0 290,000 310,000 290,000 310,000 
   
Operation & maintenance/DART unit    
1 50,000 125,000 46,729 116,822 
2 50,000 125,000 43,672 109,180 
3 50,000 125,000 40,815 102,037 
4 50,000 125,000 38,145 95,362 
5 50,000 125,000 35,649 89,123 
6 50,000 125,000 33,317 83,293 
7 50,000 125,000 31,137 77,844 
8 50,000 125,000 29,100 72,751 
9 50,000 125,000 27,197 67,992 
10 50,000 125,000 25,417 63,544 
11 50,000 125,000 23,755 59,387 
12 50,000 125,000 22,201 55,501 
13 50,000 125,000 20,748 51,871 
14 50,000 125,000 19,391 48,477 
15 50,000 125,000 18,122 45,306 
Total system cost/DART unit 1,040,000 2,185,000 745,396 1,448,489 
 
Annual system cost/DART unit  81,840 159,036 
Number of DART units assumed  3 5 
Annual system cost  245,521 795,182 
 
Note: * Assuming 7% discount rate. 
         ** Low cost estimation includes 1 DART buoy, 4 sea-level gauges, and  
               communication link at $20,000/unit; high cost estimation includes 1 DART 
buoy, 
            4 sea-level gauges, and communication link at $40,000/unit. 
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Table 6. South Pacific Island Nations: Basic Economic Statistics 
 
Countries 
 
GDP 
(US$) 
Population 
 
Area 
(sq. km) 
GDP 
 per capita 
Notes 
Fiji 2,821,605,888 853,485 18,270 3,306 [1] 
Kiribati 70,707,832 100,551 730 703 [1] 
Nauru 60,000,000 13,528 21 4,435 [2] 
Papua New Guinea 5,653,884,928 5,995,265 462,840 943 [1] 
Samoa 422,494,912 185,583 2,840 2,277 [1] 
Solomon Islands 334,846,624 489,228 28,900 684 [1] 
Tonga 222,949,600 102,448 750 2,176 [1] 
Tuvalu 14,940,000 11,992 26 1,246 [3] 
Vanuatu 387,506,304 215,341 12,190 1,800 [1] 
Subtotal 9,988,936,088 7,967,421 526,567 1,254  
      
Territories      
American Samoa (U.S.) na 59,600 200 na [1] 
Cook Islands (N.Z.) 183,200,000 18,700 236 9,797 [4] 
New Caledonia (France) 6,813,000,000 238,260 18,580 28,595 [5] 
Niue (N.Z.) 7,600,000 1,679 260 4,527 [6] 
Tokelau (N.Z.) 1,500,000 1,449 10 1,035 [7] 
Wallis and Futuna (France) 60,000,000 15,480 264 3,876 [8] 
      
Total 17,054,236,088 8,302,589 546,117 2,054  
 
Notes: Data sources and year: 
[1] World Bank (2008), 2006 
[2] Wikipedia, GDP (PPP) 2005; Population 2007 
[3] Wikipedia, GDP (PPP) 2002; Population 2007 
[4] Wikipedia, GDP (PPP) 2005; Population 2005 
[5] World Bank (2008), 2006, GDP from Wikipedia 
[6] Wikipedia, GDP (PPP) and Population 2006/2007 
[7] Wikipedia, GDP (PPP) 1993; Population 2007 
[8] Wikipedia, GDP (PPP) 2004; Population 2005 
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Table 7. Expected Annual Benefits of a Warning System  
 
Regional GDP 
($ billions) 
 
Damage 
Avoided 
(% of GDP) 
Event 
Probability 
 
Expected 
Benefits 
($ millions) 
Benefit-Cost Ratio 
 
Low    High 
10 (independent countries) 0.45 0.01 45.0 56.6 183.3 
20 (entire region) 0.45 0.01 90.0 113.2 366.6 
           
10 (independent countries) 0.45 0.002 9.0 11.3 36.7 
20 (entire region) 0.45 0.002 18.0 22.6 73.3 
           
10 (independent countries) 0.45 0.001 4.5 5.7 18.3 
20 (entire region) 0.45 0.001 9.0 11.3 36.7 
           
10 (independent countries) 0.07 0.01 7.0 8.8 28.5 
20 (entire region) 0.07 0.01 14.0 17.6 57.0 
           
10 (independent countries) 0.07 0.002 1.4 1.8 5.7 
20 (entire region) 0.07 0.002 2.8 3.5 11.4 
           
10 (independent countries) 0.07 0.001 0.7 0.9 2.9 
20 (entire region) 0.07 0.001 1.4 1.8 5.7 
           
10 (independent countries) 0.01 0.01 1.0 1.3 4.1 
20 (entire region) 0.01 0.01 2.0 2.5 8.1 
           
10 (independent countries) 0.01 0.002 0.2 0.3 0.8 
20 (entire region) 0.01 0.002 0.4 0.5 1.6 
           
10 (independent countries) 0.01 0.001 0.1 0.1 0.4 
20 (entire region) 0.01 0.001 0.2 0.3 0.8 
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 Figure 1. A Multidisciplinary Approach for Tsunami Research 
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Figure 2. Damaging Tsunamis vs. Non-Damaging Tsunamis, Worldwide 
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Source: NOAA (2005).
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Figure 3. Tsunami Warning: Time Dimension 
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Figure 4. Social and Economic Research 
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Figure 5. Natural Disasters Damage Estimation 
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Figure 6. Optimal Level of Protection 
 
 
 
 
 
